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criminal pretrial discovery and disclosure rules warrant additional scrutiny.
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means the criminal defendant has little to no realistic opportunity to
challenge forensic evidence prior to the eve of trial. We identify the impact
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There is no justification for accepting that a method is valid and
reliable in the absence of appropriate empirical evidence. . . . Forensic
science is at a crossroads.
—President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology

†

INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Turner v. United
States.1 The question before the Court concerned the scope of the
prosecutorial Brady2 obligation to disclose to the defense evidence
favorable to criminal defendants. The Turner defendants, who were
convicted of the brutal 1984 robbery and murder of a middle-aged mother
of six, steadfastly litigated their innocence. The crux of their argument
before the Supreme Court was that prosecutors had suppressed witness
statements about a possible alternative perpetrator in violation of Brady.
The federal government did not deny that it had failed to turn over
evidence favorable to the defense pretrial. Instead, it relied exclusively on
the technical argument that the at-issue alternative suspect statements were
“immaterial.” The Supreme Court agreed and held that the state’s
suppression of the witness statements did not run afoul of Brady. The
Turner case shines a harsh light on criminal defendants’ extremely limited
right to pretrial discovery. Moreover, and as demonstrated by the 2016
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
Report, Forensic Science in Criminal Courts,3 this lack of robust pretrial

†
AN ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 4, 9 (2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_forensics_addendum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQW9-FHRU].
1
137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017).
2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
3
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:
ENSURING
SCIENTIFIC
VALIDITY
OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFS5-96E2] [hereinafter PCAST Report].
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discovery can result in the admission of unreliable scientific evidence and,
ultimately, wrongful convictions in criminal proceedings.
We believe that certain structural dynamics that dominate criminal
proceedings significantly contribute to the admissibility of faulty forensic
science in criminal trials. We also believe that these dynamics are more
insidious than questionable individual prosecutorial or judicial behavior.
Not only are judges likely to be former prosecutors,4 prosecutors are
“repeat players” in criminal litigation and, as such, “typically seek to
reduce pretrial protections that would impede [their] intentions.”5
Therefore, we argue that the significant discrepancies between the civil and
criminal pretrial discovery and disclosure rules warrant additional scrutiny.
Legal commentators routinely espouse that the rules of criminal
procedure provide trial-based protections to defendants superior to those
applicable to any other litigants in the legal system.6 Even assuming the
truth of that claim, the rules of civil procedure provide many of these
protections and concomitant transparency throughout the pretrial
proceedings, during which the overwhelming majority of cases in both the

4

See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY AND
JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 5–6 (2016), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ProfessionalDiversity-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF59-GEAB] (explaining that, of President Obama’s federal
judicial appointees, “[p]rosecutors outnumber public defenders (state or federal) by three to one; [o]nly
five out of 64 circuit nominees have worked as a public defender (state or federal), compared to 24 who
have worked as prosecutors; [and a]pproximately 86% have been either corporate attorneys or
prosecutors (or both)”); Editorial, The Homogeneous Federal Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014),
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/opinion/the-homogeneous-federal-bench.html [https://perma.cc/
PLV6-G3AK] (“[U]nder the Obama administration, federal judges continue to be drawn
overwhelmingly from the ranks of prosecutors and corporate lawyers. This deprives the courts of
crucial perspectives and reduces public trust in the justice system.”); see also Dara Lind, There Hasn’t
Been a Criminal Defense Lawyer on the Supreme Court in 25 Years. That’s a Problem., VOX (Mar. 22,
2017), https://www.vox.com/2016/3/28/11306422/supreme-court-prosecutors-career [https://perma.cc/
FNY6-NGPS] (noting that while there are no former criminal defense attorneys on the Supreme Court,
there are three ex-prosecutors); Nicki Gorny, Pipeline to the Bench: New Judges Often Former
Prosecutors, OCALA STARBANNER (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.ocala.com/news/20151114/pipeline-tothe-bench-new-judges-often-former-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/BB3E-ZUDW] (stating “[i]f you
commit a crime in Marion County[, Florida,] next year, there’s a 3 in 4 chance that you’ll face a former
prosecutor on the bench”).
5
Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 47 (2014);
see also Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 400 (2007) (“In our
current criminal system, repeat players generate the means to achieve vast economies of scale resulting
in fewer criminal trials and therefore fewer opportunities to vindicate criminal procedural rights at
trial.”).
6
See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 5, at 46–47; Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting
for Deference in Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 785 (2014) (explaining
that “the structure of American criminal procedure doctrine . . . relies almost entirely on trial-based
procedures to guarantee accuracy and approaches the pretrial realm with a comparatively light
regulatory touch”).
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criminal and civil systems are resolved.7 The civil system’s unfettered
access to pretrial discovery allows both litigants and judges to thoroughly
scrutinize the reliability and validity of proffered forensic evidence before a
case goes to trial and, necessarily, before any party’s experts are allowed to
testify.8 In the criminal system, on the other hand, the near absence of any
pretrial discovery means the criminal defendant has little to no realistic
opportunity to challenge forensic evidence prior to the eve of trial.9
The pretrial rules pertaining to prosecutorial disclosure are gradually
moving in the direction of increased transparency. But they have not yet
evolved either to ensure timely, pretrial disclosure of relevant evidence to
the defense or to effectively combat the admission of flawed forensic
evidence repeatedly introduced against defendants in criminal cases. Unlike
in civil cases, criminal courts often automatically accept, rather than
thoroughly vet, forensic testimony, irrespective of its scientific reliability
and validity.10 Under Georgia law, for example, an opposing party cannot
even challenge the ability of an expert to testify in criminal proceedings
because the legislature has decreed that such opinions “shall always be
admissible.”11 Georgia’s civil expert witnesses, by comparison, are subject
to the rigorous pretrial vetting rules provided by the Federal Rules of

7

Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); see also Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.,
Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s Lament over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial,
4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010) (discussing “the vanishing jury trial”); William G. Young,
Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006)
(acknowledging that the “civil jury trial has all but disappeared”) (quoting Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 142–43 (2002)); Lawrence M.
Friedman, The Day Before Trials Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 689, 691 (2004) (“By the
end of the 19th century, it was already the case that the vast majority of convictions in felony cases
came about as a result of a guilty plea.”).
8
As the Supreme Court has aptly recognized, due to the civil discovery rules, “civil trials in the
federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear . . . for the parties to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 501 (1947); see also United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (“Modern
instruments of discovery . . . [and] pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blindman’s [sic] bluff
and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”).
9
Georgia A. Staton & Renee J. Scatena, Parallel Proceedings—A Discovery Minefield, 34 ARIZ.
ATT’Y 17, 18 (1998) (noting that “[t]he absence of mandatory disclosure and the limited permissive
disclosure provisions increase the investigative burden on the criminal defendant. The prosecution, with
its abundant resources and access to federal agents, holds the advantage.”); Meyn, supra note 5, at 41
(explaining that “[t]he absurd result is that the class of litigants traditionally warranted robust protection
receives the least protection”).
10
See generally Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002); see also
United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (admitting fingerprint comparison
evidence without conducting a Daubert hearing). In United States v. Havvard, the court described
Sherwood as an opinion “asserting that the reliability of fingerprint comparisons cannot be questioned.”
260 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
11
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (2016) (“[T]he opinions of experts on any question of science, skill,
trade, or like questions shall always be admissible . . . .”).
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Evidence and Civil Procedure.12 As one commentator explains, the
substantial discrepancies between civil and criminal expert evidence
gatekeeping are “particularly unacceptable given the law’s claim that
inaccurate criminal convictions are substantially worse than inaccurate civil
judgments, reflected in the different applicable standards of proof.”13
This Essay examines systems-level procedural problems that all too
often contribute to the admission of flawed forensics in criminal
proceedings. We begin by examining the concept of the “repeat litigant”
and its role in shaping the applicable evidentiary standards in both civil and
criminal cases. Next, we highlight the discrepancies between the pretrial
discovery and disclosure rules applicable in civil and criminal cases, and
how they exacerbate the repeat litigant advantage of prosecutors. We then
identify the impact of these variant rules by exploring the admission of
forensic odontology, or bite mark, evidence in criminal cases. Finally, this
Essay proposes the adoption of pretrial civil discovery and disclosure rules
in criminal proceedings to halt the flood of faulty forensic evidence
routinely admitted against defendants in criminal prosecutions.
I.

BACKGROUND

The September 2016 PCAST Report,14 like the NAS Report before it,15
challenged forensic disciplines to reform and implored the criminal justice
system to stop admitting faulty science to convict innocent people. The
12

The Georgia legislature has adopted standards applicable to its civil expert witnesses that are
nearly identical to those provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-7-702 (2016).
13
D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being
Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 100 (2000); see also David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and
Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L. J. 683, 714–15 (2005) (explaining that “[c]ivil litigators who venture into
criminal cases tend to be stunned and often outraged by their inability to depose government witnesses
or even to file interrogatories or requests for admissions”).
14
PCAST Report, supra note 3.
15
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z9VR-ADYV] [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. The disciplines analyzed by the NAS
REPORT were biological evidence (DNA analysis), controlled substances analysis, fingerprints (friction
ridge analysis), pattern/impression evidence, tool mark and firearm identification, hair analysis, fiber
evidence analysis, questioned document examination, paint and coatings analysis, explosives and fire
analysis, forensic odontology (bite marks), bloodstain and pattern analysis, and digital and multimedia
analysis. See also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
STRENGTHEN FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND ITS PRESENTATION THE COURTROOM 8 (2010),
https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21802
[https://perma.cc/6HBM-XDVR]
(recommending that “[t]he results of any forensic theory or technique whose validity, limitations, and
measures of uncertainty have not been established should not be admitted into evidence to prove the
guilt of an accused person”).

5

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

PCAST Report recommendations also closely tracked Federal Rule of
Evidence 702’s expert witness admissibility requirements, expounded upon
by the Daubert decision, that experts offer some kind of specialized
knowledge, that their testimony be based on sufficient facts or data, and
that it be the product of reliable methodology that has been properly
applied to the present case.16 Remarkably, the Department of Justice and
Federal Bureau of Investigation—that is, the federal prosecutors and
police—refused to adopt the PCAST Report recommendations aimed at
ensuring that only scientifically valid and reliable evidence is admissible in
the criminal courtroom.17
Articles traditionally argue that bad science permeates criminal
proceedings for at least three reasons: (1) lawyers (including judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys) lack scientific aptitude; (2) judges,
many of whom are former prosecutors, have a pro-prosecution bias; and (3)
prosecutors are more focused on securing convictions than reaching a just
result.18
But we argue that these observations miss a crucial question: Why do
judges frequently fail to keep faulty forensics out in criminal cases despite
the fact that they rigorously enforce Daubert’s gatekeeping requirements
when presiding over civil cases? Daubert requires trial judges in both civil
and criminal proceedings to determine “whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.”19 As the
relevant research reveals, however, judges are far more willing to fulfill
their gatekeeping roles in civil cases than criminal ones.20 Challenges to
forensic evidence pretrial, including Daubert hearings, are rare in the
criminal context.21 As the NAS Report makes clear, “the vast majority of
the reported opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial judges rarely
exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by prosecutors.”22 The
evidentiary standards that apply to expert forensic evidence should be
identical in civil and criminal proceedings according to the Federal Rules
of Evidence and relevant precedent, yet courts rigorously engage in
gatekeeping of such evidence in civil proceedings while giving broad
16

PCAST Report, supra note 3, at 40–43.
White House Advisory Council Report is Critical of Forensics Used in Criminal Trials: U.S.
Attorney General Says Justice Department Won’t Adopt Recommendations, WALL ST. J. (last updated
Sept. 20, 2016, 4:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-advisory-council-releases-reportcritical-of-forensics-used-in-criminal-trials-1474394743 [https://perma.cc/BM3W-M79C].
18
Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science Reform: More Sharks
in Dirty Water, 126 YALE L.J. F. 348, 352–57 (2017).
19
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
20
Risinger, supra note 13, at 99 (explaining that “as to proffers of asserted expert testimony, civil
defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers most of the time, and that
criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges to government proffers”).
21
Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions
for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S107 (2005); Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science:
How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1998).
22
NAS REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.
17
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leeway to prosecutors in criminal proceedings.23 Therefore, the courts’
failure to exclude faulty forensics in criminal cases cannot be explained
away simply by pointing to judges’ lack of scientific prowess.
Nor can the courts’ repeated failure to exclude unreliable criminal
expert evidence be excused by assertions that the type of scientific
evidence proffered in civil cases is either substantially materially different
or easier for judges to evaluate than that propounded in criminal cases.
Virtually every imaginable criminal case has a civil analogue, which
requires production of the same or similar evidence to secure a verdict
(albeit under the relaxed preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence standards of review).24 Moreover, we argue that, to the
extent that there is any material difference in the type of scientific evidence
propounded between the two types of proceedings, it is civil cases,
including products liability and mass toxic tort cases, and not criminal
cases that typically present more difficult reliability, validity, and causation
questions for courts.25
We further contend that the frequent admission of flawed forensics in
criminal cases cannot be blamed solely on pro-prosecution bias or proconviction motives. Even a cursory comparison of the criminal and civil
pretrial discovery and disclosure rules demonstrate that a systems-level
problem is a contributing culprit. While civil defendants have successfully
implored courts to set the bar very high for the admission of scientific
evidence, such as epidemiological and toxicological causation evidence,
prosecutors have encouraged courts to readily admit forensic evidence that
does not withstand scientific scrutiny.

23

Shniderman, supra note 18, at 354.
For example, “[a]ll states provide for a [civil] cause of action for wrongful death by a Wrongful
Death Statute.” Jay W. Elston, State Wrongful Death Acts and Maritime Torts, 39 TEX. L. REV. 643,
645 (1961); see also, e.g., Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 13, at 687 (explaining that “[a]s recently as
the nineteenth century—indeed, well into the twentieth century—civil and criminal proceedings were,
in essence, alternative ways for aggrieved victims of wrongs to enlist the adjudicative machinery of the
state in seeking redress”).
25
Déirdre Dwyer, (Why) are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV.
381, 387–88 (2007) (explaining the uniqueness of epidemiological evidence of causation in toxic tort to
civil proceedings and positing that such evidence “has a high scientific content, and the demonstration
of causation is indirect in that it rests on arguments about whether the claimant was statistically more
likely to suffer harm as a result of exposure to the allegedly toxic substance. The scientific evidence has
not been collected to address directly the question of whether a specific individual has suffered harm”);
see also Risinger, supra note 13, at 102 (explaining that “[i]t is unlikely to be pure coincidence that the
Supreme Court chose a civil case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., to review the
appropriate criteria of dependability, or that its two subsequent forays into these waters have also been
in civil cases”) (footnote omitted).
24
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II. PRETRIAL RULES FAVOR THE REPEAT LITIGANT
Certain litigants in both the civil and criminal systems are “repeat
players.” Whereas the repeat players in civil litigation are defendant
corporate and government entities, the repeat players in the criminal justice
system are prosecutors.26 Repeat players influence pretrial adjudication by
“advocating for interpretations of rules and decisions that favor long-term
litigation objectives.”27 Individual civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants
(“one-shotters or OSs”), on the other hand, are incentivized to “seek out . . .
short-term gain[s] that may on balance harm future civil plaintiffs and
criminal defendants,” rather than pursue any long game.28 As Professor
Rothstein explains:
The large-volume litigant is able to achieve the most favorable forum;
emphasize different issues in different courts; take advantage of differences in
procedure among courts at the state and federal levels; drop or compromise
unpromising cases without fear of heavy financial loss; stall some cases and
push others; and create rule conflicts in lower courts to encourage assumption
of jurisdiction in higher courts.29

The key takeaway here is that although repeat litigants are not
successful on every position that they advance in court, the sheer volume of
litigation that they control allows them to make incremental changes in the
law that, over time, amount to considerable long-term advantages.
In that connection, repeat-player civil defendant corporations have
made it a priority to enhance judicial scrutiny of scientific forensic
evidence. In Daubert itself, for example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
fought hard to ensure that the jury was precluded from hearing expert
epidemiological evidence linking its anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, to the
young plaintiffs’ limb-reduction birth defects.30 In Joiner, the General
Electric Company similarly battled to exclude plaintiff’s expert evidence
linking his lung cancer to exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
while employed as a company electrician.31 Notably, and much like the
overwhelming majority of important post-Daubert federal appellate

26

Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (explaining that “[t]he spouse in a divorce case, the auto-injury
claimant, the criminal accused are OSs [one-shotters]; the insurance company, the prosecutor, the
finance company are RPs [repeat players]”).
27
Meyn, supra note 5, at 47.
28
Id.
29
Lawrence E. Rothstein, The Myth of Sisyphus: Legal Services Efforts on Behalf of the Poor, 7 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 493, 501 (1974).
30
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583–85 (1993).
31
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 136 (1997).

8

112:1 (2017)

Discovering Forensic Fraud

decisions, the Daubert trilogy32 is comprised exclusively of civil cases
involving repeat-player corporate defendants.33
Neither Federal Rule of Evidence 702 nor Daubert distinguish in any
manner between civil and criminal cases regarding the admissibility
standards that pertain to expert evidence.34 Indeed, “evidence law to a
significant extent was itself a product of treating criminal and civil cases
alike. . . . [It] has remained unified because the rebuttable presumption has
remained that rules of evidence should apply ‘across the board.’”35
Nonetheless, judges have “assessed the ‘reliability’ of expert testimony in
civil cases much more rigorously than in criminal cases.”36 Since Daubert,
traditional forms of criminal forensic evidence, such as bite marks,
handwriting, hair samples, and fingerprints, have been admitted routinely,
bypassing the rigorous methodology scrutiny that applies to, for example,
epidemiological and toxicological causation evidence in civil products
liability and toxic tort cases. As one commentator concluded, “[j]udicial
scrutiny in civil litigation and judicial passivity in criminal litigation is
aligned with the repeat-player dynamic unique to each forum.”37 Corporate
defendants in civil cases routinely challenge the faulty forensic evidence
used against them, pushing judges to be more skeptical in civil
proceedings. By contrast, prosecutors consistently introduce the same
evidence in criminal cases, encouraging judges in criminal proceedings to
rely on precedent. Over time, this has created a discrepancy in how trial
judges rule on scientific evidence in civil versus criminal settings that
cannot be explained by a difference in substantive law or the applicable
rules of evidence.
III. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that all parties freely
exchange information, including the disclosure of any expert evidence
throughout the pretrial proceedings.38 By contrast, prosecutors are required
32

The Daubert trilogy includes Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
33
Neufield, supra note 21, at S109 (explaining that “it is not a coincidence that . . . almost all of the
post-Daubert federal appellate decisions that further defined the standard have been civil rather than
criminal”).
34
Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 13, at 730–31.
35
Id. at 728, 730.
36
Id. at 731.
37
Meyn, supra note 5, at 48 (internal citations omitted).
38
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26. Expert evidence must be disclosed pretrial pursuant to Federal
Rules of Evidence 702, 703 and 706.
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to provide criminal defendants very limited pretrial discovery. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for example, do not entitle a criminal
defendant to review either his grand jury transcript or any of the evidence
the government presented to the grand jury.39 The government does not
have to provide the defendant any statements made by government
attorneys or any of its witnesses, including law enforcement agents.40
Neither the government nor the accused is subject to any automatic
disclosure requirements except the prosecutor’s Brady v. Maryland41 duty
to produce exculpatory evidence.42 Moreover, discovery depositions are
nonexistent in the criminal justice system. Indeed, criminal depositions are
permitted exclusively to preserve the testimony of a party’s own witness
who may be unavailable for trial.43
By contrast, open and mandatory disclosure of proffered scientific
expert evidence pretrial in the civil system has had a significant impact on
the quality of forensic evidence, generally, and causation evidence,
specifically, that a civil plaintiff must proffer to survive a Daubert
challenge. As Professor Joseph Sanders explains, “[i]n no area [of the law]
has the Daubert revolution had a greater effect than in [civil] toxic torts.
The number of cases in which expert causation testimony has been
excluded must by now run into the thousands.”44 In marked contrast to the
criticism surrounding courts’ routine admission of questionable criminal
forensic evidence, “[m]any commentators have reacted negatively to this
trend [of excluding general causation evidence in civil cases], arguing that
the bar has been set too high.”45 Regardless of whether one agrees that the
39

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(3).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). Under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, the government’s witness
statements are only discoverable by the defense after the witness has testified on direct examination and
after the defense has properly requested the statements. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670–
71 (1957).
41
373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
42
Notably, the prosecution is not required to disclose Brady material pre-plea so long as other due
process protections are in place. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002) (explaining that where
government was required to give defendant information regarding factual innocence before plea no
other Brady disclosure was required).
43
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(1). As Professor Meyn recently explained, “[t]he resistance to granting a
criminal defendant the power to investigate has deep roots.” Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The
Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1120 (2014). The historical
arguments against extending formal pretrial discovery to criminal defendants include concerns that such
a levelling of the pretrial investigatory playing field would give criminal defendants an unfair
advantage, enable them to threaten and intimidate witnesses, and lead to the misuse formal powers. Id.
at 1127–33. Additional anti-reform arguments include allegations that the trial is proper testing of a
criminal case, criminal defendants already have enough rights, and extension of formal discovery to
criminal defendants would be too costly. Id. at 1133–38.
44
Joseph Sanders, Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L.
REV. 1367, 1374 (2010).
45
Id. (emphasis added); see also Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices,
and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309,
322 (2002) (noting that judges presiding over civil cases “reported that they were more likely to
scrutinize expert testimony before trial and were less likely to admit it” post-Daubert).
40
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admissibility standards applicable to general causation evidence in civil
cases strike the right balance, it is widely acknowledged that the
predominant exclusionary decisions have forced toxic tort and products
liability plaintiffs to proffer high quality scientific evidence to survive
pretrial Daubert challenges.46
IV. LACK OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
CONTRIBUTES TO THE CONTINUED ADMISSION OF FAULTY FORENSICS
The lack of discovery of scientific evidence pretrial in the criminal
justice system both effects individual cases and contributes to the culture of
admission particular to certain forensic disciplines. The PCAST Report
highlighted the need for increased rigor in assessing the scientific validity
of evidence from a variety of forensic disciplines, many of which employ
feature-comparison methodologies, including hair, latent fingerprint,
firearm, DNA complex-mixture sample, footwear, and bite mark analysis.47
As the Report frankly explains, “reviews by competent bodies of the
scientific underpinnings of forensic disciplines and the use in courtrooms
of evidence based on those disciplines have revealed a dismaying
frequency of instances of use of forensic evidence that do not pass an
objective test of scientific validity.”48
Bite mark evidence, otherwise known as forensic odontology, has
been the subject of significant scrutiny. Forensic odontology entails
examining marks left on skin or an object to determine if they are human
bite marks and then comparing those human bite marks to a suspect’s
dental impressions.49 Not only has the discipline proven incapable of
reliably individuating an alleged bite mark—that is, establishing that a bite
mark belongs to a specific individual— it cannot even reliably identify skin
marks as human bite marks or not.50 As recently as the spring of 2015, the
American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO) was unable to find
consensus among thirty-nine ABFO-certified bite mark experts on whether
46

LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE
FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION xv (2001), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1439.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG72-CA9E] (detailing that
“[federal] judges scrutinized reliability more carefully and applied stricter standards in deciding whether
to admit expert evidence” post-Daubert).
47
PCAST REPORT, supra note 3.
48
Id. at 22.
49
Id. at 8.
50
See, e.g., Michael J. Saks et al., Forensic Bitemark Identification: Weak Foundations,
Exaggerated Claims, 3 J.L. & BIOSCI. 538, 562–63 (2016) (finding that in a study of board-certified
forensic dentists, experts could not agree reliably on the threshold issue of whether or not a wound was
a human bite mark).
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a patterned injury was a human bite mark or if it had identifying features
for individualization.51 In the same year, the Assistant Director of the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy singled out bite mark
evidence as an example of an unreliable forensic discipline and called for
its “eradication.”52
Shockingly, courts continue to admit bite mark evidence in criminal
trials and do so virtually exclusively on the bases of precedent.
Demonstrating the powerful influence of the repeat litigant prosecutor,
courts continue to admit prosecutor’s proffers of unreliable bite mark
evidence in criminal cases, notwithstanding the fact that “bite mark
evidence has led to more than two dozen wrongful arrests or convictions.”53
Indeed, admitting courts mistakenly rely on prosecutorial arguments that
bite marks have been accepted as a valid scientific theory by a sister court
instead of conducting an independent Daubert analysis.54 The treatise on
Modern Scientific Evidence itself states that “rather than the field [of
forensic odontology] convincing the courts of the sufficiency of its
knowledge and skills, admission by the courts seems to have convinced the
forensic odontology community that, despite their doubts, they were indeed
able to perform bite mark identifications after all.”55
Worse yet, courts have justified their admission of bite mark evidence
by relying on certain bite mark cases that resulted in wrongful
convictions.56 In State v. Armstrong, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals took judicial notice of the “general acceptance” of bite mark
evidence, provoking a cascade of similar court rulings.57 The Armstrong
Court, however, had relied on the Wisconsin case of Robert Lee Stinson,

51

Radley Balko, A Bite Mark Matching Advocacy Group Just Conducted a Study that Discredits
Bite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/
2015/04/08/a-bite-mark-matching-advocacy-group-just-conducted-a-study-that-discredits-bite-markevidence/ [https://perma.cc/E7PK-6MP6] [hereinafter Balko, Bite Mark Matching Advocacy Group].
52
Radley Balko, A High-Ranking Obama Official Just Called for the “Eradication” of Bite Mark
Evidence, WASH. POST (Jul. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/
2015/07/22/a-high-ranking-obama-official-just-called-for-the-eradication-of-bite-mark-evidence
[https://perma.cc/D6YZ-67XF] [hereinafter Balko, High-Ranking Obama Official].
53
Radley Balko, Incredibly, Prosecutors are Still Defending Bite Mark Evidence, WASH. POST
(Jan.
30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/30/incrediblyprosecutors-are-still-defending-bite-mark-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/QCV9-JA5E] [hereinafter Balko,
Prosecutors].
54
Saks et al., supra note 50 at 546 (explaining that, in Burke v. Town of Walpole, 2004 WL 502617
(D. Mass. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 405 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2005), “the federal magistrate
judge appeared never to doubt the validity of bite mark expertise though the best the court could do to
support its faith was to cite cases that cite cases that express the same credulousness”).
55
4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 35:4. The Judicial Response to Expert
Testimony on Bitemark Identification, (2016–2017).
56
M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s Overdue
Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 42 & n.173 (2016).
57
State v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988).
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who was ultimately exonerated of his crime in 2009 through DNA
evidence,58 in reaching that conclusion.
Notwithstanding this admonition, not a single federal or state criminal
court has upheld a challenge to exclude bite mark evidence to date.59
Instead, the only serious evaluation of bite mark evidence by courts has
occurred in civil post-conviction habeas corpus cases and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
lawsuits for wrongful conviction and presentation of false evidence at
trial.60 The lack of analysis by criminal trial courts in this context is
particularly disheartening given that one of the rationales for replacing the
Frye v. United States61 general acceptance rule with the Daubert analysis
was the notion that certain types of evidence offered as “knowledge”
frequently creep into general acceptance without any careful examination
of its scientific reliability and validity and “[t]his is especially likely to be
true of knowledge that has been widely accepted for a considerable time.”62

58

State v. Stinson, 397 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986).
Balko, High-Ranking Obama Official, supra note 52.
60
See, e.g., Keko v. Hingle, 318 F.3d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 2003) (denying absolute immunity to
forensic odontologist in § 1983 civil lawsuit following wrongful conviction); Ege v. Yukins, 380 F.
Supp. 2d 852, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 485 F.3d 364 (6th
Cir. 2007) (ruling “there is no question that the [bite mark] evidence in this case was unreliable and not
worthy of consideration by a jury”); In re Richards, 63 Cal. 4th 291, 315 (2016) (court granting civil
writ of habeas corpus ruling bite mark expert’s criminal trial testimony constituted material false
evidence); Stinson v. Milwaukee, 2013 WL 5447916, at *12–13 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (denying absolute
immunity to forensic odontologists in § 1983 civil lawsuit alleging fabrication and suppression of
evidence) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Stinson v. Gauger, 799 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015).
61
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony regarding an early version of a systolic blood
pressure-based lie detector test. Id. at 1014. The Frye Court famously held that “while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. (emphasis added). “The Frye
Standard was extremely administrable given that the presiding judge did not need to understand the
theories supporting the scientific testimony at hand; he only needed to determine whether the scientific
community had accepted the supporting theories as valid.” Claire R. Rollor, Logic, Not Evidence,
Supports a Change in Expert Testimony Standards: Why Evidentiary Standards Promulgated by the
Supreme Court for Scientific Expert Testimony are Inappropriate and Inefficient When Applied in
Patent Infringement Suits, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 313, 326 (2013). For an extensive discussion of Frye
and its application to the admission of novel expert evidence, see Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197
(1980).
62
David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the
Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1799, 1811 & n.37 (1994) (citing Philip H. Abelson, The Need for Skepticism, 138 SCI. 75
(1962)).
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V. SOLUTION: PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
As explained above, “[i]n civil cases and especially tort cases,
judges . . . enforce Daubert aggressively and often insightfully, showing
considerable acumen about research methodology.”63 Indeed, “[i]n federal
courts, where the decision is legally binding, Daubert has become a potent
weapon of tort reform by causing judges to scrutinize [civil] scientific
evidence more closely.”64 As a result, the authors endorse the adoption of
federal civil pretrial discovery and disclosure procedure in criminal cases.
We are not alone. In the wake of the public revelations of wrongful
convictions in their respective states, Texas, North Carolina, and West
Virginia have reformed their criminal discovery standards to provide preplea disclosure of evidence to the defendant.65
Alan Gell was freed from North Carolina’s death row because the
prosecution suppressed, throughout his trial proceedings, significant
exculpatory and impeachment evidence, including the statements of
seventeen separate witnesses, each of whom saw the victim alive after Mr.
Gell was incarcerated.66 In response, North Carolina adopted open criminal
discovery in 2004.67 In 2011, the state’s legislature enacted the Forensic
Sciences Act, which automatically requires law enforcement officers and
crime labs—investigative agencies under the wing of the prosecution—to
disclose evidence to the defense.68 The Act also criminalized the failure of
law enforcement to disclose scientific evidence, including analyst working
papers such as bench notes and preliminary tests, to prosecutors.69
Emphasizing investigative agencies’ obligation to disclose their own
evidence to the prosecution is particularly important. In Kyles v. Whitley,
the United States Supreme Court expanded prosecutorial Brady obligations
by holding that prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose favorable
evidence to the defense, including evidence in the hands of the police
unknown to the prosecutor.70 After the Supreme Court reversed Mr. Kyles’s
63

Michael J. Saks, Judging Admissibility, 35 J. CORP. L. 135, 144 (2009).
Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472 (2005).
65
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2017); 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 515; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2015); Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 218 (W. Va. 2015).
66
Alexandra
Gross,
Alan
Gell,
THE
NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3236
[https://perma.cc/XM5J-FQTN].
67
See 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 515; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and
the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 272–76 (2008) (explaining the relationship between the Gell case and the
subsequent criminal discovery reforms enacted by the North Carolina legislature).
68
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2017).
69
Id.
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514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (finding the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose material
evidence, including “a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government’s behalf in the case, including the police”).
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conviction, the prosecution retried him three times, resulting in three hung
juries. More pertinently, the prosecution provided previously undisclosed
and material police evidence to the defense at each of these retrials.71
In West Virginia, Joseph Buffey pled guilty to rape and burglary while
prosecutors were in possession of exculpating DNA evidence.72 Mr. Buffey
spent the next thirteen years attempting to retract his guilty plea, which
local prosecutors uniformly resisted. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals ultimately allowed Mr. Buffey to rescind his guilty plea, and ruled
that all state prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal
defendants pre-plea.73 Accordingly, West Virginia—the same state that
judicially noticed bite mark evidence—requires the prosecution to disclose
Brady evidence to the defense during plea negotiations. Notably, in a
concurrence in the Buffey decision, Justice Allen Hays Loughry stated,
“[t]here is simply no room in our judicial system for unethical evidentiary
gamesmanship.”74
In Texas, Michael Morton was wrongfully convicted of his wife’s
murder after his prosecutor—who later became a judge—hid exculpatory
evidence.75 The Texas legislature responded by passing the Michael Morton
Act, which requires full open-file discovery of favorable evidence “as soon
as practicable” after the prosecution receives a request.76
These states range in their definitions of what constitutes “open-file
discovery” from exculpatory evidence only in West Virginia to all evidence
in the prosecutor’s file in North Carolina. In all six states with opendiscovery provisions, the prosecution is required to disclose—at a
minimum—evidence favorable to the defense pretrial.77 Generally, openfile discovery means the defendant is entitled to the complete file of the
prosecution, law enforcement, and any other agencies working for the
prosecution. The term “file” broadly includes “witness statements,
investigating officers’ notes, results of [forensic] tests and examinations,”
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bench notes and working papers from forensic lab analysts, forensic expert
reports, and any other forensic evidence collected during the
investigation.78 Consistent with the position taken by the American Bar
Association, open-file states generally require prosecutors to disclose all
evidence related to a case pre-plea.79
The purpose of open-file discovery is to increase the reliability and
accuracy of criminal proceedings. As eloquently stated by Professor Robert
Mosteller, “[open files] do not rely on the ethical judgment of a prosecutor
involved in a fiercely competitive adversary trial process to determine what
is exculpatory. Instead, they impose a blanket rule of general disclosure.”80
The Honorable Alex Kozinski, Judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and Senior Advisor to PCAST, likewise
suggests open-file discovery as a reform for prosecutorial misconduct.81 As
Professor Jennifer Laurin has made clear, “[e]xpanding and accelerating
defense access to information adduced in the state’s investigation is one of
the most promising mechanisms to remedy reliability-diminishing features
of pretrial activities.”82
And yet, even if the Supreme Court had ruled in Turner that Brady
was broad enough to demand prosecutorial disclosure of the alternative
perpetrator witness statements to the defense, which it did not, Brady
would remain an insufficient safeguard and continue to fall far short of the
civil discovery rules.83 Despite Brady’s narrow scope, the Department of
Justice has strongly resisted the incorporation of Brady and its progeny into
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Needless to say, the Department
has vehemently opposed the adoption of a parity-based open discovery and
78

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (2011).
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(2015).
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Laurin, supra note 6, at 842.
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It is worth emphasizing here that the authors do not endorse the notion that the adoption of Brady
and its progeny in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 would be sufficient to curtail the admission of
flawed forensic evidence in criminal proceedings. As one scholar has aptly summarized:
[C]onstitutional rules that would subject the prosecutor’s (and police’s) actions to the scrutiny of
the defense—in particular the rule of Brady v. Maryland and its progeny entitling the defense, as a
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Id. at 794–95.
79

16

112:1 (2017)

Discovering Forensic Fraud

disclosure system comparable to those mandated by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Thus, pretrial discovery and disclosure available to federal
defendants remain extremely limited, the ABA’s proposed reforms and the
recent evolution of state rules toward open-file criminal discovery
notwithstanding.84
CONCLUSION
This Essay responds to a critical situation in our modern criminal
justice system: the ongoing and affirmative use of flawed forensic evidence
by prosecutors. We have taken this opportunity to identify an underlying
systemic issue of discovery by comparing the lax admission standards of
false scientific evidence in criminal cases with the rigorous vetting of even
valid and reliable scientific evidence in the civil context. In both criminal
and civil cases, the same evidence is reviewed by the same judges applying
the same standard of admission of scientific evidence: Daubert. The
difference, and one that undermines the accuracy not only of the evidence
presented but also of criminal convictions, is the pretrial discovery and
disclosure rules binding the courtroom players. We propose that the
criminal justice system adopt the party-parity civil pretrial discovery and
disclosure rules. Such leveling of the playing field may return integrity to
prosecutors’ offices and restore trust in our criminal adjudications.
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